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How Does International Law Condition Responses to Conflict and Negotiation? 
 
Dr. Aoife O’Donoghue, Durham Law School 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the role law plays in defining conflict and its consequences. Two 
elements of law’s categorisations are critical; first law’s cataloguing of activities fixing 
actions into particular classifications and second law’s choosing of temporal points from 
which to analyse conflict, looking both forward and backward at events. The article uses two 
case studies to demonstrate these two features; Rwanda and Ukraine. Both examples, one 
historical the other contemporary, are replete with examples of law’s categorisations of 
events and temporal points while demonstrating the tremendous impact that these choices 
have upon our understanding of how negotiations ought to proceed. This article does not call 
for a withdrawal of law from these situations but rather cognisance that heavy reliance on law 
can serve to mask both events and actors critical to successful negotiation and parties must 
bare this in mind when dealing with conflict. 
 
 
Policy Implications 
 
1. The consequences of law’s expansion into all areas of conflict and negotiation ought to be 
reconsidered; 
2. Reliance on law’s account of events may not necessarily serve the end of achieving a 
negotiated end to conflict; 
3. Decision-makers should seek to question what law's narrative omits through its 
classifications. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The enterprise of producing “good” lawyers and indeed good international lawyers revolves 
around investing students with the ability to evaluate events according to a pre-ordained set 
of tools. Almost by instinct lawyers, no matter what their legal tradition, understand events 
through a consistent frame. Lawyers, both academic and practitioner, categorise, define and 
set forth advice based on concepts of reasonableness, proportionality, necessity and most 
critically, a law-based categorisation of events even in the most political of contexts. Of 
course, legal and political theory from positivist, critical or cosmopolitanism perspectives 
have explored the many inherent contradictions involved in this form of reasoning (Kennedy, 
1987; Marks, 2006; Posner, 2009). Nonetheless this is the frame students are taught to engage 
with, no matter what the legal genre. Arguably this is never more apparent than when lawyers 
set about considering violence and conflict as law seeks to look both backward to understand 
causes and identify culprits and forward to offer resolution and pathways to peace. This paper 
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considers how individual states and international organisations respond to on-going violence 
or conflict when viewed through the prism of law. In particular, this article questions the 
decision points at which law looks back and forward as well as the impact this has on our 
understanding of conflict and negotiation. Picking the starting point matters as it is from here 
we adjudge claims, both legal and political, and thus make a variety of demands upon 
negotiation. 
 
The paper explores the extent to which categorisations and temporal points are used to depict 
events leading to negotiation and asks whether strict legal approaches result in an 
entrenchment of oppositional narratives. In examining two conflicts, Rwanda and Uganda, 
the article seeks to demonstrate the variety of categorisations used by law to differentiate 
between events including what is and what is not a conflict, which actors are involved and 
how and why conflicts begin and end. These two examples demonstrate that current 
international legal practice in choosing temporal moments and categorisations of events can 
be detrimental to uncovering hidden narratives and lead to the hampering of processes of 
political negotiation. The illogicality of some international legal rules are obvious, though 
their underlying rationales are also important to law’s operative foundation. Certainty in law, 
and particularly international law, empowers some to predict what law entitles and enables 
actors to do. Yet, Ukraine and Rwanda epitomise how such claims can be entirely predicated 
upon choosing one moment as of critical import to law. 
  
 
2. Law’s Categorisation 
 
An initial legal ordering between the initial use of force and international humanitarian law 
leads to a particular understanding of why and how conflict occurs but other categorisations 
are equally relevant including; how violence is defined, determining when violence becomes 
conflict and whether armed conflict is ‘internal’ or ‘internationalised’. Each of these 
categorisations in turn sets the parameters of negotiations between parties. They will dictate 
which parties are present and what legal regimes are applied. They dictate what is visible in 
the negotiation process as well as what is invisible. These categorisations dictate who is 
considered legitimate and a necessary negotiating partner, as well as defining the temporal 
scope of the ‘conflict’. As such the categorisations have both a substantive and temporal 
effect on how lawyers deal with violent conflict and the negotiations that follow. As the 
march toward ever increasing legality continues it is imperative that law does not come to 
colonise questions that it should share with politics. Lawfare demonstrates the utilisation of 
law as both a legitimating factor and a weapon against an opponent nonetheless there remains 
a question about law’s fundamental operation that is apart from its instrumentalisation 
(Dunlap, 2008). For international law the initial framing inquiry is whether violence can be 
said to constitute an armed conflict, or is simply a series of violent low-level events that 
ought to be left to regular policing. 
 
These questions typically centre first on whether a necessary threshold of force has been 
passed, and second on who is engaged in the violence. International legal classifications 
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divide conflict into ‘international’, ‘internal’, or ‘internationanlised’ conflicts. The rules that 
are applicable, as well as the parties subject to the law vary depending on this categorisation. 
The potential scope for international intervention, both during and after the conflict, depend 
on this categorisation. For example whether the conflict is deemed to impact on international 
peace and security, or whether it invokes the legal Responsibility to Protect will depend on 
the categorisation of the conflict and the label that parties, both external and internal, apply to 
it. Similarly the categorisation of the conflict will determine the applicability of the rules of 
international humanitarian law, and the ultimate accountability for the conduct of the conflict. 
For example is there a violation of international human rights law, a crime of aggression, 
does the International Criminal Court have jurisdiction, is there an issue of peremptory norm 
violation. This scene setting classification determines how all other categorisations unfold. 
Thus, when is internal violence merely a matter of domestic criminal law and policing action, 
even if it involves the military, and what elevates it into an internal armed conflict? Each of 
these questions leads down a particular path that shapes our understanding of what is 
happening often to the detriment of alternative paths of legal, or other, investigation. For 
those seeking intervention the focus on the humanitarian dimension of the conflict and the 
creation or reiteration of legal fictions whilst professing to not create 'precedent' is a 
consistent clarion. Of course this first assumes a very particular understanding of violence 
that most often results in the exclusion of economic or social violence as well as the systemic 
violence to which women are subject. It also leads to notable silences in respect of violence. 
States have recently become fond of stating that the actions of terrorists are purely criminal 
acts and thus not open to further international legal scrutiny. Therefore the question of who is 
involved in violence and why is also a constant factor in categorising conflict, whether 
explicitly or implicitly. 
 
However it is suggested here that violence should be understood in its broadest sense to 
incorporate economic violence including disregard of economic and social rights, widespread 
corruption, the plunder of natural resources and extreme austerity measures that lead to 
protest and conflict and as well as physical violence that leads to injury and death amongst 
the general population within a country (Sharp, 2013). By conflict this paper utilises its legal 
conception. Thus a conflict occurs where a state of violence is reached the threshold that 
either an internal armed conflict can be said to be happening, or it goes beyond mere border 
instances between states. Such a definition specifically excludes the wars on terror or drugs 
or any other rhetorical approach rather focusing on the intensity of violence which may 
ultimately include events that lead from campaigns against terrorism or drugs (Akende, 
2012). Of course this definition is problematic. Law struggles to define the intensity of 
violence that falls just below this rather opaque threshold, particularly in its economic form, 
which leads to the exclusion of incidences where basic human rights are systematically 
violated. These exclusions demonstrate how inadequate the law is by itself in understanding 
violence, conflict and negotiation. 
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3.  Case Studies 
 
This article uses two examples, Rwanda and Ukraine to consider what the standard 
international legal arguments reveal about how we regard ongoing violence. The article 
considers what the law does or does not do in each of these scenarios and what solutions law 
proffers as a result of its classifications. These two examples are chosen to demonstrate the 
variety of options within law for those who seek to negotiate an end to conflict. The Rwandan 
genocide is now at such a historical distance that law’s interaction can more clearly be 
demarcated. Ukraine as a contemporary conflict proffers alternate narratives of how, through 
the same legal prism, we understand that conflict. Both conflicts share a number of actors but 
the differing responses amongst them, arguably following particular legal categorisation, 
produces differing agents and forms for negotiation, demonstrating the discretion permissible 
though rarely admitted to by lawyers.  
 
 
a. Rwanda  
The 1994 events in Rwanda have been repeatedly discussed however these accounts are 
worth reconsidering as they demonstrate the pervasive forms of categorisation as well as 
what is captured by law and what is, at times, purposively ignored. The genocide is widely 
characterised in an oversimplified narrative of violence between two competing ethnic 
groups, to which the international community was little more than a helpless bystander. It is 
an often cited example of the equivocal approach of the international community to 
international law, and in particular of the limits of international law in responding to an 
internal conflict. However deeper analysis reveals a much more complicated picture of law 
and politics in the years preceding the genocide, one which a legal narrative fails to 
adequately capture. 
When genocide against the Tutsi began UN peacekeepers, alongside other international 
organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, were heavily engaged in Rwandan 
governance.
i
 The presence of international organisations, following several Security Council 
and OAU interventions, was on the invitation of the Rwandan Government, to ensure the 
implementation of the Arusha Agreement.
ii
 Thus the genocide began in a post-conflict and 
negotiation scenario. When the plane of President Habyarimana was shot down and conflict 
re-erupted leading to genocide UN peacekeepers were in attendance to witness and report the 
violence as it unfolded and indeed to seek assistance.
iii
 The failure to provide the requested 
support is well documented and acknowledged by the UN although in a rather limited 
temporal understanding of events,
iv
 one which isolates the immediate period during which the 
genocide occurred and excludes the preceding context. When UN assistance first arrived it 
was to assist in the removal of foreigners rather than the protection of Rwandans.
v
 Whilst the 
genocide continued for a considerable period there was little new intervention to prevent or 
stop the violence albeit there were debates resulting in UN Secretary General Reports and 
Security Council Resolutions. The genocide ended when the RPF, acting out of Ugandan 
territory, took control of the state and ended the violence. 
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Rwanda’s genocide is full of examples of legal definitions and categorisations having a 
significant impact on how we build both the narrative of what occurred but also how we 
regard the decisions which were made during negotiations. First, to look at what was 
subsequently omitted from the dominant legal narratives. The decision of the Security 
Council eventually to employ the term genocide is itself a decision to deploy legal 
categorisations. Its delayed invocation derived from a fear of what is expected of states and 
international organisations, both politically and legally, once they know or ought to know 
genocide is occurring (Straus 2005). In this way international law and the obligations it 
entailed framed the actions of the Security Council in respect of intervention. The partial 
internationalising of the conflict from the RPF bases in Uganda or the presence of 
international actors was all but ignored as Rwanda was consistently considered an internal 
conflict and subsequent categorisations maintained this legal tagging. Similarly the Arusha 
Agreement formed part of a negotiated settlement signed by the major parties. The presence 
of peacekeepers to bring an end to an existing conflict rather than to engage or end violence 
which was "new" was an essential feature of the Agreement. As the Agreement had 
categorised the conflict as resolved, violence occurring outside the temporal scope of conflict 
as framed in the Agreement was not visible in the narrative of the peacekeeping mission. 
Finally, whilst, the failure to intervene militarily to stop the genocide and the lack of 
willingness by the "international community" to use the tools open to it under Chapter VII of 
the Charter seems to be the main lesson learned this is not examined in the context of the long 
engagement by external actors in Rwanda but rather is isolated as a period of exceptional 
violence that was unrelated to the existing international intervention.  
Regarding the Arusha Agreement as a negotiated settlement beyond the Tutsi and Hutu 
groups re-orientates our view to broaden the temporal understanding of events but also to 
include a broader array of actors. As part of this negotiation the then Rwandan Hutu 
Government accepted strict IMF and World Bank led policies, largely conforming to the 
Washington Consensus, in order to receive funds to keep the country operating (Storey, 2001; 
Anderson, 2000). Thus Rwanda began to open its economy to foreign direct investment and 
to undertake a programme of austerity. The conditionality imposed by both the IMF and 
World Bank Group led to much internal dissatisfaction and hardship, yet this form of 
economic intervention does not come under the categorisation of violence or conflict which 
lawyers utilise nor is part of the narrative that underpins the economic hardship which 
contributed to the mutual suspicion building within the country (Orford, 2001). 
Rwanda’s classification as an internal conflict combined with Arusha Agreement designation 
as resolving a former conflict was fundamental to the reactions which followed. The creation 
of the first Hutu led Government in Burundi and the assassination of President 
Ndadaye which resulted in mass killings of Tutsis within that territory fails to feature in how 
the violence in Rwanda was understood before or during the genocide or in the transition 
which followed.
vi
 Issues stemming from the colonial period (France was still heavily engaged 
in region as well as others such as the UK and the USA) in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, 
and their historic divisions further contributed to tensions albeit international law remains 
determined that steadfast territorial boundaries are essential to peace.
vii
 For the law it was an 
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internal armed conflict and while the Arusha negotiations did engage these states the 
categorisations of the conflict masked the much broader implications of what was occurring 
in each country and stood beyond law's ability to catalogue what was necessary for 
negotiations. 
Clear legal invocations both during and subsequent to the genocide were the direct result of 
international inaction. The subsequent creation of the ICTR was the Security Council's 
eventual Chapter VII attempt to legally account for the genocide once it had ended and 
seeming stability, mirroring the Arusha Agreement, created. Albeit its concern was internal to 
Rwanda again not looking to all the actors involved before, during and after the genocide.
 viii
 
The ultimate legal intervention, the ICTR, is probably as lawyerly as is possible to be where 
violence has occurred. Individual criminal responsibility categorises our perception of what 
happens and who was responsible for events by-passing other narratives that may be essential 
when setting about negotiations. The lack of action or intervention during the genocide is 
often cited as the rationale for the creation of Responsibility to Protect (Stahn, 2007).
ix
 
Responsibility to Protect emerges from an understanding of military or humanitarian 
intervention rather than recognising that the ongoing interventions, by a variety of 
international actors, had contributed to the circumstances in which genocide occurred.  
Economic interventions by states and international organisations, the presence of 
peacekeepers, the colonial legacy, and the nature of Hutu/Tutsi relations across several states 
are left un-captured by both the understanding of what happened in Rwanda but also the 
development of Responsibility to Protect. Whilst the soon to be enforced crime of aggression 
goes someway to recognising that events go beyond the individual the legal response did not 
call into question the multiple actors involved in the descent into genocide instead law looked 
only as far back as the President’s death and as far forward as individual criminal 
responsibility thus leaving but a partial account of events in Rwanda. 
b. Ukraine 
As a contemporary conflict Ukraine has yet to be subject to extended analysis. The Orange 
Revolution’s mass protests and the Supreme Court’s overturning of elections resulted in little 
change with Viktor Yanukovych returning to power until he fled to Russia in 2014. Ongoing 
low-level violence including the imprisonment of opposition politicians led to increasing 
protest and violent state reactions. In 2013 protests concerning Ukraine’s relationships with 
its immediate largest neighbours, the EU and Russia, led to constitutional crises. Following 
the departure of Yanukovych, Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk began to agitate to succeed. 
Crimea, following military action by Russia and a hastily held referendum succeeded and 
joined Russia. The conflict continues in the east of the country with intermittent ceasefires 
interspersing violence. However the conflict is represented as one over rights of self 
determination and minority rights and protections, thus bringing it within the framework of 
international law and the protection of civil and political rights. 
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It is critical to understand what is currently omitted from the narrative. Ukrainian economic 
choices formed an important element of the descent into conflict with protesters objecting to 
the decision of President Yanukovych to abandon an Association Agreement with the EU and 
in its stead sign an Agreement with Russia. The EU Agreement was ultimately signed in 
2014.
x
 The Ukrainian economy remains crippled and active only through EU, US and IMF 
support albeit with austerity measures imposed through conditionality.
xi
 The eastern 
breakaway regions and Crimea are equally dependent on Russia, itself having economic woes 
following the imposition of sanctions and the drop in oil prices. Ukrainian debates on these 
economic and political choices were matched by external pressure from both the EU and 
Russia. The forms of economic and political coercion, aside from threats of the use of force 
and sanctions, casts doubt on the notion of consent based sovereign equality under the UN 
Charter and how we characterise the choices available to states.
xii
 Certainly the choices that 
Ukraine had with regard to these treaties could hardly be claimed to be without economic 
compulsion, in the form of market access, fuel access and financial support, and indeed, as it 
ultimately played out, the use of military force. 
Ukraine, since independence, has continuously been in negotiation with outside forces to the 
extent that its initial act to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for a guarantee of its 
borders and freedom from economic coercion seems foolhardy.
xiii
 Indeed the Budapest 
Memorandum is an outright acknowledgement that without nuclear weapons Ukraine needed 
its neighbours to pledge that they would not use force or economic coercion to influence its 
actions. The catalyst for the current violence, an international treaty with either the EU or a 
doppelganger with Russia, was a clear choice between two forms of international actor 
becoming involved within Ukraine. While the EU option offered a multilateral partnership, 
Russia provided secure energy supplies and financial support. Both options were to the 
exclusion of the other. Arguably, the choice of treaty arrangement put Ukraine in an almost 
impossible position, legally binding itself to one powerful neighbour or the other was never 
going to appease either. Whilst international law may claim that Article 2.4 of the Charter 
guarantees the sovereign equality of states and the Budapest Memorandum guaranteed a life 
without coercion all of these elements are paradigmatic of international order that regards 
conflict and violence through a very particular prism and often omits the context from its 
understanding of negotiation.  
Ukraine is oft regarded as an internal conflict whose internationalisation depends upon the 
nature of Russia's military intervention, the annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s activities in 
Eastern Ukraine. With intermittent political and economic violence coupled with various 
forms of negotiation involving a plethora of internal and external actors resulting in treaties, 
guarantees and assurances but much of the violence and its causes eludes law’s gaze. Yet, 
counter-intuitively perhaps and especially at the outset, negotiations took place either without 
Ukrainian representation or with these actors largely sidelined, as such, settling an apparently 
internal conflict without domestic negotiators.  
Yet, other events have made their way into law’s vision of how negotiations should proceed. 
President Yanukovych’s eventual step-down is a good example of law's use to legitimise 
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subsequent action. Thus, whether outside forces regard Yanukovych as removed by 
illegitimate forces, impeached by the Ukrainian Parliament or in a coup affects subsequent 
elections organised by Kiev and in the various breakaway regions. The UK Foreign 
Secretary, mirroring the EU’s view, insisted that Yanukovych's removal was legitimate and 
in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution whilst Russia denied this possibility.
xiv
 The 
acceptance of the constitutional legitimacy of this act centres the EU's rhetoric in recognising 
the subsequent Kiev led elections whilst not recognising the voting-based activities in other 
regions. That the legal legitimacy lies with Kiev as a question of internal Ukrainian law is 
assumed by the EU rather than questioned.  
Russia engages a variety of legal categorisations; its bi-lateral agreement to hold military 
bases in Crimea, an obligation to protect Russians or Russian speakers within breakaway 
regions as well as the areas' historic “Russianness.” Whilst Russia does not claim a right of 
humanitarian intervention it is, much as it did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, at a minimum 
arguing for the right to protect nationals abroad. Regarding Crimea, Russia makes several 
historic legal claims, that it was always part of Russia, that Soviet Leader Khrushchev “gave” 
it to Ukraine whilst drunk thus seeking to delegitimise the internal re-ordering of borders in 
the Soviet era, the contested agreement as to NATO expansion, or the irrelevance of the 1774 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarcathat with the Ottoman Empire. The notion of Ukrainian Rus 
together with the mythologisation of an indistinct point in history and the existence of a 
nation has played a central role in Russia’s arguments. Indeed in harking back to the 
Ukrainian Rus, Russia is invoking a 'bordered' nation state that never existed but seeks to 
categorise its actions as a form of self-determination rather the sacrosanct nature of borders 
that, as in Rwanda, international law promotes. The sanctions introduced by the EU and the 
US are also of a curious character; states not wanting to violate trade rules, not able to use the 
Security Council and left with a situation where self-defence without Ukraine asking for 
intervention leaves few options. Whilst the West has had some success with sanctions these 
have not been of real benefit to Ukraine. 
As Russian troops left their treaty bases and Crimea held its referendum to succeed from 
Ukraine the narrative of self-determination and succession became significant. After holding 
referenda and elections, Crimea alongside the Donetsk and Luhansk successions, appear to 
fall short of the standards of the legitimate exercise of self-determination, yet there is 
uncertainty in how groups may carry through their will (Sterio, 2013). Whilst the methods of 
succession within international law are unsettled what made these referenda illegitimate, 
according to the EU and US, was the haste in which they were held, the intimidation which 
accompanied them and the impact upon minorities such as the Tatars. Whilst these critiques 
are valid the same legal tests were not put to the actors in Kiev nor did the EU or US set 
terms on how self-determination may be otherwise accomplished. Various examples, from 
Kosovo to South Ossetia and Abkhazia are proffered depending on what legal category actors 
wish the breakaway regions to sit within. While Russia consistently opposed Kosovo’s 
independence most European states have recognised its statehood with the opposite outcome 
for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Whilst there are differences between all of these regions the 
lack of coherence within the law of succession and in the recognition of new states has left 
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various parties claiming differing independence positions and the right to be legitimate 
representatives at negotiation.  
In many ways events have all but stopped being about Ukraine and rather become a 
confrontation between Russia and the West with discussions of a new Cold War abounding 
and the Ukrainians themselves becoming side-lined. Legal categorisations are everywhere in 
Ukraine, from Yanukovych removal, the nature of policing protests, the right to self-
determination, the character of referenda, the right or otherwise of parties to be present at 
negotiations, the characterisation of military intervention to the internationalisation of 
conflict. Whether law has provided any guidance through the complicated escalation of 
violence is debatable whereas its instrumentalisation - even when the invocation is clearly 
inaccurate or blinkered - is present. Whilst the ever-increasing use of legal argument in the 
post Charter era has often been depicted as positive Ukraine provides a clear example of 
where the legal categorisation of events masks political claims making negotiation more 
difficult. 
4. Conclusion 
The paper questions how we engage law when tackling violence and conflict and, in turn, 
how this impacts upon negotiations, before descent into violence, during the conflict and in 
its aftermath. Both Rwanda and Ukraine abound with examples of how we categorise events 
and the points at which the law chooses to look forward and backward that, in turn, impact 
tremendously on how negotiations proceed. Juridification has advanced at full pelt over the 
past decades resulting in some important successes but this paper queries whether law’s 
categorisations of key events and temporal determinations have become a burden upon 
negotiation. 
Rwanda demonstrates that in focusing on one event, the genocide, law neglects the failures of 
the previous negotiations or the multitude of international actors that remain ever present. 
Whilst Ukraine demonstrates that law as a legitimating source for rhetoric has been as much a 
tool of propaganda for parties choosing their tactics as it is a device for resolving the conflict. 
These outcomes are not based on the indeterminate character of law but rather on conflict, 
violence and negotiation’s political character and the potential for supplanting political 
engagement with law. If law supplants all else it only serves to mask narratives rather than 
providing an elucidating force. When strict legal delineations entrench particular narratives 
over others they cloak both actions and actors. The consequences of this upon the ultimate 
satisfactory character of any negotiation should be recognised. This is not a call to abandon 
law but rather a recognition that law, in looking forward and backward from a single 
temporal point, can only provide partial solutions and truths and that over reliance on law’s 
framing of conflict may lead to conflict's perpetuation rather than its successful negotiation. 
                                                          
i
 Details on UNAMIR can be found here, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm 
ii
 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 
1993, Security Council Resolution 812 Rwanda (12 March 1993), Security Council Resolution Rwanda 846 (22 
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June 1993), Security Council Resolution Rwanda 872 (5 October 1993), Security Council Resolution on 
extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda and implementation of the Arusha Peace 
Agreement 909 (5 April 1994) 
iii
 Security Council Resolution 912 on adjustment of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda due 
to the current situation in Rwanda and settlement of the Rwandan conflict (21 April 1994) Security Council 
Resolution 935 requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Commission of Experts to examine violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda (1 July 1994) 
iv
 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, (15 December 1999) UN Doc. S/1999/1257 
v
 Security Council Resolution 918 on the expansion of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
and imposition of an arms embargo on Rwanda (5 April 1994) 
vi
 International Commission of Inquiry established under resolution 1012 (1995) concerning Burundi 
vii
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3 (b), UN Charter, Article 2 (4) 
viii
 Security Council Resolution 955 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8 November 1994) 
ix
 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect, 
VII,  
x
 http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/association_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf 
xi
 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car090214a.htm 
xii
 Article 52 VCLT 
xiii
 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances 
xiv https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-ukraine-syria-
and-iran 
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